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Senate
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER

3, 1975
the United states to discuss energy legislation and the approaching September 1
deadline, at which time decontrols and
allocations would automatically expire.
A13 I say, I went down there 1n my own
capacity, on my own 1n1tiative. A13 a result of the conversations I had with the
President, I informed him that It was my
intention to call a conference of the
Democratic Senators on either Wednesday or Thursday to discuss his suggestions and my conversation. That meeting
will be held at noon tomorrow, at which
time I will make a full report to the
Democrats assembled, and whatever action will be taken at that time will be
taken by the Democrats 1n conference
assembled.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may have printed 1n the
RECORD at this time a statement I made
on the price of gasoline and what I proposed, dated July 22, 1975; also, a letter
to the President dated August 1, 1975; a
letter to the President dated August 29,
1975; a paper on the' Energy Allocation
Act and why It should be extended; a
paper entitled "The National Interest
Would Best Be Served by Extending the
Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act";
and also a paper entitled "Settling the
Oil Price Issue With a Program of Gradual Decontrol Is Possible," stating that It
would be enacted in 30 days under certain
circumstances. All the material from
August 29, 1975, has been sent to every
Senator in this body, both Republican
and Democrat, including our newest
Member <Mr. COTTON), and also to the
House leadership, so that everybody will
be aware of what I was attempting to do
on my own Initiative and be Informed
thereby.
There being no objection, the material
was ordered to be printed In the RECORD,
as follows:
STATEMENT 01' SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD,
JULY 2!1, 1975

ENERGY LEGISLATION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, on
Friday last, on my own tntt1at1ve, I requested a meettng wtth the President of

There Is no questloa but that the price of
gasoline Is going to Increase, no matter which
way we turn. The President bas proposed a
gTadual decontrol of prices on oil produced
in tbla country trom fields that were In
operation In 1973, that Ia "old" oil. The price
of that oil Is t5.26 per barrel, while the "new ..
oll produced sells for roughly •13.60 a barrel,
the same, 1n effect, as imported foreign oil.
There are no price controlS on crude oil produced from new fields, from small stripper
wells In old fields, or on above-1972 production levels for old wells.
There Is llttle or no Incentive tor owners of
wellS whlcb produce an average o! 16-20 barrels a day to keep on producing under present circumstances. They could let their production decline below ten barrelS dally so
that they could quality for the free-market
stripper-well prices and, as a result, could ·
make more money from producing less oU.
They wlll not lnV11St in secondary or tert11U'f
recovery methods becaUBe they' could not afford to do so whU& tbey receive f5.26 per
barrel.
The existing controlS expire on August 81.
If they do, there wm be a very abrupt ln•
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to what price are questions tha.t can be answered In a legislative forum. ·
As you know, In the last seveu.l days, many
o! us here 1.n 13l.e Con,gres~> haft been meetIng with Mr. GnleRSJIIIUl, Mr. Zarb and others
within the Ac1Inlm5trablan to the end that
a mutually agreeable solution along these
lines wou\d eme:r:ge. Ncy 1mpre861on Is that
we have come close--very close--to arriving
at a sa.tlstactory a.nawer; one that a.ll sides
could live with and one that would demonstrate to the American people that their government--both branches, both houses of
Congress and botQ. parties-Is working In
harmony to resolve this most difficult Issue.
As close as we have come, however, time cUd
not permit the solution to emerge. As a result, we are left In an extraordinary poslt)on.
Without restraint, oil price Increases could
seriously damage the economy at a time when
110me hopeful signs .are beg1nnlng to develop
In oerta.ln sectors. WIUlout restra.lnt, oil price
increaselil would provide profit .rewards of Inordinate and unconscionable dimensions and
at the cruel expense o! those of our cl tlzens
least able to afford enormous price Increases.
No slngle eco1>0mlst, In or out o! govern;meu.t, welcomes the all•at..once spectre of
!11DMS1lra:lned oU prices with unrestrained lmpa.ct .on ~e .A.m.er.lca.n consumer. That the
ftna.l details of an :ag1·eeahle prlctng formula.
have not been worked out, however, does not
mean that, at le6St !or the interim, we should
not seek together to prevent what all agree
would be the dlsa.stero'tls consequences
brought on by the full econam.lc Impact o!
abrupt decontrol and no restraining or mitigating levers at a.ll, be they aimed at equltallle allocatJ.ODII, prices or prof!ts or offsetting rebates. I! allowed to ha.ppen, In my
.Judgment, the damage occasioned would not
and could not be rec'tltled.
To avoid such sn occurrence Is the reason
I write this letter. It Is to provide you with
my thoughts Dn thla laaue which 1 view with
the greatest Oegnee D! concern. It Is to &d.vise
you that 1n ·~ ,tuctgment ltbe opportunity
exlsta to enact a. sens!hle G>U prloe policy; one
perhaps that will not give all sides everything they seek, but one Which does not leave
the Nation wtth the won>t of a.ll possible
worlds--as Is the lllltuatlon we face If the
Emergency Allocation Act Is not extended. In
my judgment, an extension of tbe Allocation
Act would avoid for the Nation the "worst
OFnc!: ar nn: MA.roRtTY L~<ADtt,
~~ali" options. I am conftc1ent that you wlll
WIIShit&gton, D.C., A11g11st 1, 1975.
provide <the leadersh.V> that will permit the
THE PRESIDENT
constructive process o! the pa.st six months
to continue.
·
TJte JVIt-tte llrnue,
Washington, D.C.
'Sincerely,
DEAR Mil. PRESIDENT: As we enter the st&t.uMntJ< MANSFU:LD.
tory August adjournment, an assessment of
P.S.-I bel!Jlve the .added time will permit
natlona.l energy policy Is essentt.a.l. During
the pnst six (6) months, the federal govern- the completion or a truly natlona.l policy on
ment has a'btlempted te ~ome 40 years of energy w0t'kec1 out be'tween the branches. We
1nattentloa by g~ ~ highest pi'Iorlty to he.ve oome a long way s1noe January, both on
the development or a national energy policy. -enel!gY and .eoonomk ncovery.
"You have Pf'Ov\ded grea.t focus and stimulus
OFFICE OJI' TED: MA.roarrY LEADJ!:Il,
to these efforts. I personally have never witWashington, D.C., August 29, 1975.
nessed a more intensive undertaldng by any
Congress and I beHeve these efforts by so THE Plu:sm~<NT,
many have been most productive. However, The White House,
there remain eertam a.speets of the compre- Washington, D.O.
DEAR MR. Plti!!&IBEI'n: On A'tlgust 1, I wrote
hensive program t1l.a.t have yet to be resolved.
Among these are prlclng aspects with regard you expreeeln& me persona.! view that the
to domestic on. I bel.leve, however, that even national lntereat could best be served at this
this dUI'Icult determination will soon be time by an extemilon of oil prlce restraints
achieved. This Is particularly so 1n view o! beyond the ~at month. Since that time
tm fact that on 110 ma!ly energy policy Issues l have had sn oppol'tunlty to consider the
there has been substantial cooperation an4 matter further .&ncl a.m e:v.en more firml5'
acoord between tbe Congress and the Admin- convinced of the Impending perl,l to the economy posed by unrestre.in.ed across-the-boe.rd
istration.
We ha7l.e a.ll become more informed on the prlce Increases tn petroleum products. I am
convinced as well that I! -given a little time
de.ta.lls at the .energy pr.oblem .and especla.lly
the Executive and Leglsl&Uve Branchee can
an. ho:w emergy .declsions precJ,plta.te economic come
to terms with a solution to the energy
oonsequelllleS .
m}Uiel!. ha.ve advocated a
policy Ql ~ual remova.l or controls and price prclblem ~ble to all sides.
It liB Jar t.bese U'8.Stl1lA that I -again wrt te
I believe the development of such a ,poilcy
wm e:v.ol¥11 JIB tiLe Leglalatille process Is per- you to tl:le -.11 that the Nation .might avctd
wttte4 to wDtlt lt.s wm. Over what period and the ex.traord.I.Jluy posl.tlon .now taoed. Nel-

crease In prices which will tend to halt the
economic recovery which now_seems to be
In progress and turn It Into a backward slide.
The President has ·proposed a plan to gradually ll!t controls on a month by month ba.sls
over a thirty-month period. Federal Energy
Administrator Zarb estimates that prices
would Increase by 1 '/2 cents per gallon by the
end o! tills year, by 2 \l.z cents more in 1976
and by 3 cen.ts more In 1977, !or a total increase of 'I cents a gallon. This,ln my opinion,
is an undec-estlmtttlon of the price riees which
would W1rJ l&el:V occur.
1 would ~ :tba.t, Instead a! decontrols
being phe.aedcnlt G>VM a thirty-month period,
.t.&at serious cmm14er&tlon should be given
to phase tlll.em out over a 4-6 year period. The'
President a.lso .should put an end to the $2
a barrel tax on Imported oil. An excess profits
tax Shottld appl:y m>t just on producers of
deoontrolled ~ll. but on profits from new oil
as well.
It appears t.o me that there Is room !or
compramtse ~n the Congressional and
the Adm.M1u.t.r&tlan poin.t.ll o! view. If something Is not dame and this deadlock Is allowed to continue. the people will suffer more
and more. "The on produced wll1 be less and
lesa and the conseque=es, based on the effect
this would have throughout the economy,
would be cns.trous. The President ca.nnot
-and Illll&t not &llow a.11 controls to expire Oil
A~gust 81. The deadlock which now exists
·must be broken ~ J).erha.ps some o! the
suggestions I ha.ve made could be used a.s
the basis !or a compromise which would benefit the people of the nation and the economy..
It we can:r~ot, as repreeentr.tlves of the two
bra.nches of government, work io:wards such
a p0681tl111ty !or the common good, then W'hat
I ha.ve said at tbe beginning would still hold,
except that tbe "rippling" economic results
would be cat&atroph1c.
No matter what we do, it 1s going to call
tor Increased costs. Wba.t we ought to endeavor to do Is to handle these Increased
oosts on a prolonged ba.sis so that the economic effect will be minimal. I repeat, no
matter which way we turn, the cost o! oil
ts going to tnerea.se. There Ia no way to avoid
tbJII and with that foot in mlncl, the <Jongre~~~~
a.lld :tbe Pt'esldent have a. duty to get together
to wnrk out an a,greement which will be
best· for the na tlon.

.r.
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ther the Administration nor the Congrc cs
seek abrupt and total decontrol. Together.
both Branches and both parties have workc:i
diligently to produce a solution to the enert~Y
pricing Issue. I am frank to say that It bas
been your effort that .bas provided the primary Impetus to the energy Issue and t.o the
need to develop a comprehensive energy poiley for the Nation. Beenusc o! your effort,
much bns been done to shape and Implement such a pdllcy; more, In tact, In the
past six months than -ever before In the Notion's history. Before the August adjournment It wa.s clear that we had come close
to resolving the only major energy Issue remaining to be resolved-the question of pha'ing out price controls In the most orderly
and non-dlsrupt.lve manner possible.
On July 16, the Senate passed S-1849, the
Emergency f'etrqJ.eum Allocation EKtenslon
Act o! 1975, by a vote of 62 to 29 with eight
Senators not voting. On July Sl, the House
o! Representatives paszed the Senate bill by
.a. vote o! 303 to 117 with 14 not voting. Thus.
the Congress has overwhelmingly expre•sed
its view with regard flo the pressing need for
an extension o! the Act !or a 6-month period.
Tb.., issue now centers on whether or not
there w1ll be a veto of the Act when It Is
fPl'esen.ted for your signature, which brings
me directly to the point o! major concern .
What I suggest Is that simply because tlle
tina! detnlls of an agreeable pricing policy
have not emerged, the Nation should not be
m&de to sufft'r the consequences o! no pricIng policy a.t all as Is the ca.se with totnl
decontrol, nor sho\\Jd the efforts' to work out
the final details of such a policy be abandoned.
I am frank to say that I do not know what
wlll happen come Labor Day with winter
close behind, when, barring an extension, all
controls will end. There are as many views
on this mntter as there are "experts." What
further confuses the picture is the !act that
no one knows what will happen when the
OPEC cartel meets three weeks !rom now t.o
discuss :t=ther price Increases. What Is clear
to me, however, In spite o! the lfs, ands and
buts, Is that the consumer will be hurt come
September I! controls &re not eK.tended, that
the price o! petroleum and an or Its by-products will go up. thnt the prices of otlher energy sources will go up, that Inflation wUl
be rekindled throughout the economy, that
the burden o! all of this wm be borne most
by those In our society who can least afford
lt, that the tllckers of economic recovery now
Indicated could well be snuffed out and U1at
we might expect n r eturn to double-digit ln:l'latlon, clo~e to double-digit tmemployment
and a much gren1Rr budget deficit thl\n all'Mdy projected. What Is also compelling In
1th811e d.rcumsta.nces ~a ttlat there &1'e absolatel:y no measures on the books that woult!
serve to mitigate the adver~e Impact o! total
decontrol , be they In the form o! w1nd!all
profits taxes, tax rebates to particularly llnrdpressed consumers or protection for ~mall.
Independent producer s who might otherwise
be driven out o! the marketplace.
In short, the potentia.! perils poeed bv
abrupt and total deco'ntrol are c.le&r enough
to me t.o urge that we In the Congress be
permitted to continue to explore with the
Executive the possibility o! a more orderly
and less d isrupt! ve approach to the prlcl '>g
Issue. That we have oome close to agreement
already Is encouraging. For the sake o! the
Nation, I hope we are allowed to continue
these negotlatllons. To them and to their
s uccess I stand firmly committed .
·
Respectfully,
MIKE MANSFIELD .
TH1!: ENERCY .ALLOCATION ACT !::HOULD BE
'EXTENDED

1. The Congress a.nd the .Aod'mlnlstrAtion

can pr.oduce a reasonable sol.uUon to the
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oil price question which Includes an orderly natural gas curtaUments will monopolize
phase-out of controls and far less disruption available supplies.
(b) With projected shortages of natural
to the economy than would occur from total
gas, It Is Imperative to have a petroleum
and abrupt decontrol.
2. Total decontrol with the ripple etrect allocation program tn place to assure that
means a return to double-digit Inflation alternative fuel supplies are made available
with higher costs for food. gasoline. clothing, to curtailed gas customers. This will help
air transportation, medical costs, home heat- minimize the number of plant clos~nga due
to fuel shortages.
ing oil, etc..
(c) The availability of oil products to
3. Total decontrol means a return to 9
percent unemployment and, very likely, sparsely settled sections or the country w111
double digits.
be endangered tn the absence of a manda·
4. Total decontrol means a budget deficit tory petroleum allocation program.
(d) .tn the event or a severe wtnter, or In
even larger than now projected.
6. Total decontrol falls hardest on the case or a !uture oil embargo, It Is essential
poor, the unemployed-those least able to that the machinery for allocating petroleum
products be continually In place.
bear the burden.
6. There are no mitigating measures; no · 4. There are no measures on the books that
wt.nd!all profits taxes; no tax cuts or rebates; would mitigate the adverse Impact of total/
nnd no competitive protections for small, In- a.o• .J.pi decontrol.
(a) Congress has not passed wind!all profits
dependent producers who will be driven out
taxes.
of the market.
(b) Congress has not passed further tax
7. OPEC Intends to raise prices-It meets
September 23-thus creating even grea~cr cuts to alleviate the consumer's burden.
(c) There are no pro~ctlons for small tn·
disruption to the economy.
dependent produoem.
5. The terznlnatlon or the Emergency PetroTHE NATIONAL IN"TR<'ST WOULD BEST BE
leum Allocation Act threatens to severely
SERVED BT ErTnmiNG 'THJ: EMERGENCY
reduce competition .tn the petroleum tndusPETIIOLJroM ALLocATION Ac:r
I . Virtuallv all !'"pnomi•ts Pp-ree that It the try.
(a) Elimination or controls will mean that
Petroleum Allocation Act Is not extended,
It me~ chaoe and disruption to the econ- many Independent refiners will be squeezed
out
of business because major Integrated peomY..
(a) Even without the $2 per barrel tarltf troleum companies will have access to much
on Imported oil, oil decontrol will directly lower cost crude oil. The old on will not go
up In cost to the Integrated producer, but
Inflate oil prices by •IS billion annually.
(b) The multiplier and ripple effe~t could only to the tndependent purchasers.
(b) Ellmtnatlon of controls will mean the
cause between $20 and ..so billion in InflaIndependent service station operators will be
tionary Impact on the economy.
turther
squeezed out of .bus.ness because ot
(c) The stimulus o! the tax cut would be
tho cost an,si supply advantages that will
wiped out.
(d) It will drain consumer spending power accrue to the major Integrated petroleum
!or all other goods and services and will companies.
6. There Is already evidence of the damage
badly hurt economic recovery.
As Examples: The coats o! propane, of to the economy of decontrol.
(a) Many petroleum companies have al·
fertilizer.• . or air tra-•"ortattnn, or auto
transportation, ot synthetic fibers will all ready substantially Increased their prices In
recent months by passtng through costs.
increase.
.
(b) This has created much greater public
2. OPEC Is scheduled to meet ~eptember 2S
hostility
to even further price Increases.
to discuss Increases.
(c) The moet recent reports on tnflatton
(a) A $1.50 per barrel OPEC Increase will
add another ell to $10 billion annually to Indicate that rood and fuel prices are again
Inflation-further increasing the costs of causing rapid tn1iatlon throughout the
all goods and servloee dependent upon economy. To prevent this cycle from getting
out of hand, If<. Is Imperative that oU ptlcee
petroleum and Its by-products.
(b) Domestic decontrol o! oil prices sig- be controlled.
(d) Even the petroleum Industry no longer
nals OPEC that high prices are o.k. Decontroll!ng domestic prices and removal of the speaks with one voloe. The MobU Oil Corpotariff provides OPEO with an opportunity to ration, In a letter to the members ot the
Increase their prices by
and claim they Senate dated August ~2. 1976, calla for phased
are not lncreasl- 1!' the total price for the decontrol of oil pr1cea over an extended
period ot time and tndlcates that Immediate
United States consumers.
(c) In the absence of domestic controls, decontrol as would occur with the expiration
any tncrease posted by OPEO may be quickly o! the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act
cause a shock to America's fragile
followed by Increases In domestic prices as "might
well. Veto of the Petroleum Allocation Act economlo recovery."
(e)
Arthur
Burns has Indicated that oU
removes the FEA's authority to establish
domestic oil prices and ell'ectlvely substi- price decontrol may reeult In a ~-percent tntutes OPEO price control over domestic crease tn tn1lat1on, substantially more than
the Admtn1strat1on'a eetlmate. All or these
energy.
factors may shift the balance tn favor ot
(d) Steeply higher petroleum prices w!U overriding tbe President's veto.
reduce the demand for all other goods and
7. A veto will hurt the chances for enaotlng
services. As a consequence, the Impact on
employment has been estimated to be a toes a national energy program. A vato at thle time
means a total co=ttment to llky-hlgh prices
of up to 500,000 Jobs. The transportation by the President. Signing tbe bUI prondes
Industry, food producers, medical services,
universities that can't pass on coets, and the oppmunlty tor the compromise ~simply
many other eecton w1ll be especially hard because It Is only a llix-month extenaton).
The House 1s currently POnsldertng H.R. 70J4,
hit.
.
which I.e scheduled to be completed on an
8. Winter 1s approaching. The lees ot pe- urgent b6sls. To that measure can be added
troleum all0011otlon authority w111 severely the product ot any compromise workect out
Impact the nation thh winter.
between the Oongreee and the Admtnlatra•
(a) With the erptratton or allocation au- tlon.
thority, control8 over propane wm lapse.
Propane prloea to farmers and rural real· SETTI.ING TJD On. ~ I&8uJ: , W'rr11 A J'ltodents will steeply rise and euppllee of proGilAK a. GUDUAL Illlo!urnloL Ill ~
pane wW be very tight to household oonIT OoULD Bw ENAOnD 'WlTBnf 118 DU'B .
eumera. Without allocatton, utU1ttee and
I. Only a 1hort time Ill needed tQ settae the
large Industrial users that are experiencing decontrol is&ue.
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The House voted 228 to 189 on the Presl·
dent's proposal to phase out controls over a
39-month. period. A needed switch ot 20
members Indicates that the two branohee are
coining closer to settling the oU price Issue.
In the national tnterest this ell'ort must be
continued to avoid the economic disruption
of total and abrupt decontrol and to p~;event
the OPEC cartel from setting oil price policy
tor the nation. A phase-out over what pe·
rlod o! time and to what price lid are Issues
that can be resolved.
It Is reasonable to propose that the matter
can be settled within SO days. But time Is
needed.
If signed Into law and not vetoed, S. 1849
would provide the time. It would extend
current controls for six months. Six months
may be too long. But the two Houses could
act on a measure for an orderly, less-dlsrup·
tlve phase-out well within the next 30 days.
When It returns on Wednesday, the House
will have under consideration H.R. 7014, the
energy bill to which a phase-out program
could be added. For Its part, the Senate could
consider a phase-out proposal well within
the next SO days and the Leadership Is w11llng to co=it the Senate to that undertaktng.
The alternative of veto (unless overrld·
den) provides no time for cooperation and
compromise. This alternative moves the nation tnto total and abrupt decontrol on
Labor Day. OPEC meets In three weeks aJI.d
oil prices then and thereafter would be
dictated by the OPEC cartel. In SO days, Oon·
grees and the Executive together can IM!ttle
on an oil price pollcf for American consumers. The veto alternative would veet the
OPEC cartel with this power.
IT. Time Is needed to act on other essential measures related to decontrol.
Gradual decontrol Is pa.rt or a comprehensive program requiring other legislative action. Tl.me Is required to enact these propoeals needed to oll'set the adversity ot de·
control.
Only I! S. 1849 Is not vetoed would Congress have the time-the opportunity to enact other essential elements of the President's program which complement decontrol
and provide protection tor consumers and
the economy.
These Include windfall proftte ta:ree, tax
rebates/cuts and the preservation of competition (protection tor small, Independent
producers !rom predatory praotlcee by large
companies).
None of these measures are now on the
books. They too could be considered and dis·
posed of wlthtn SO days.

